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THE PLACE OF SANCTIONS IN PROFESSOR H.L.A.
HART'S CONCEPT OF LAW
LEO KANOWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
In his 1958 Harvard Law Review exchange with Lon Fuller, Professor
H.L.A. Hart of Oxford University wrote:
It is surely not arguable (without some desperate extension of
the word "sanction" or artificial meaning of the word "law")
that every law in a municipal system must have a sanction, yet
it is at least plausible to argue that a legal system must, to be a
legal system, provide sanctions for certain of its rules.'
Three years later Professor Hart published his book, The Concept of
Law.2 Widely acclaimed as a significant and important contribution to
twentieth-century jurisprudential thought,' the book in large part represents an elaboration of the simple idea expressed above. For Hart makes
clear that, though he shares with John Austin, Hans Kelsen and legal
positivism in general an insistence upon the separation of "is" and
"ought" and a high regard for linguistic analysis of legal terms, he rejects
their basically common view that no part of law can be understood without reference to the monopolization of coercive power in the hands of an
overriding political authority. Whether formulated in Austin's terms that
law is essentially and exclusively a system of habitually obeyed commands of the sovereign addressed to his subjects, violation of which will
lead to the imposition of sanctions; or in Kelsen's, that law is to be understood as a system of depersonalized directions to officials to impose given
sanctions upon the occurrence of certain events (conditions), Hart spurns
the imperative analysis as being inadequate to describe the essential
* Associate Professor, The University of New Mexico School of Law; Member, California Bar.
1. Hart, Positivism and the Separation oj Law and Morals, 71 Hv.
L. REv. 593, 621
(1958).
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART].
3. See e.g., Summers, Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Law, 1963 DUKE L.J. 629
(1963); Hughes, Professor Hart's Concept of Law, 25 MOD. L. REV. 319 (1962).
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features of a developed legal system. For Hart, "law without sanctions is
perfectly conceivable." 4
At the same time, elements of imperativism are not entirely absent
from Professor Hart's conception of law. The ingredient of coercion
underlying Austin's command theory, for example, forms very much a
part of Hart's theoretical structure, although found there in greatly modified guise. Thus, Hart concedes the monopoly of coercive legal rules in
what he regards as "primitive" as opposed to "developed" legal systems.
Like Kelsen, however, he rejects Austin's concept of "habitual obedience"
and its supporting idea that law is addressed by a sovereign to his subjects-finding fault by means of linguistic analysis with the ideas of
command, address, and the notion of a continuous and uninterrupted
sovereignty, all of which are either expressed or implicit in Austin's work.
Even in his examination of developed legal systems, which is the main
focus of his study, Hart would grant considerable importance to the element of force. Here, however, he insists upon two fundamental qualifications. First, he would confine the significance of coercive legal rules or,
as he sometimes calls them, "orders backed by threats," to specific areas,
such as torts or criminal law, i.e., to those spheres in which the conduct of
the populace is subject to constant regulation. In Hart's reconstructed
analysis, such coercive rules are characterized as "primary rules of obligation"; they "impose duties, . . . concern actions involving physical

movement or change"' and make human conduct "non-optional or obligatory." 6
Of utmost importance to Hart is the necessity to distinguish these
primary rules of obligation from other rules of law, described as "powerconferring" rules, which fall into two distinct categories: private and
public. In the private sphere, such rules confer power upon people to
make contracts, to marry, to bequeath property, to buy and sell goods,
and the like. In the public sphere, they are found principally in legal
formulations empowering legislators to legislate and courts to adjudicate
(and, incidentally, also to engage in law-making).
Reduced to their simplest terms, Hart's views concerning the legal rules
he describes as power-conferring may be stated as follows: Where powerconferring rules are operative, it is not the function of law to force people
to conduct themselves in certain ways; rather, in those areas, law
enables people to do things and to create relations which, but for the
existence of those legal rules, they could not otherwise do or create.
Hart's power-conferring rules, especially those in the public sphere,
4. HART 38.
5. Id. at 79.
6. Id. at 80.
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also provide a springboard for his development of a scheme of "secondary
rules of recognition, adjudication and change," with the rule of recognition, a concept not fundamentally distinguishable from Kelsen's Grundnorm, occupying a central place in his system.
Affecting the great discoverer's role so characteristic of legal philosophers in general, and of Austin and Kelsen in particular, Hart proclaims
repeatedly that the "key to the science of jurisprudence" 7 is to be found
in the union of these primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of
recognition, adjudication and change. Not unlike Kelsen and his pure
theory (nor for that matter, Austin himself), Hart nowhere suggests
what lies beyond the doors to be unlocked by his key.
The second qualification Hart insists upon in his concession to the
coercive character of primary rules of obligation in a developed legal
system is his idea (based in part upon the theories of the Scandinavian
realists8 ) that the element of force inherent in such rules represents only
one of their sides, namely, their "external" aspect. Hart stresses that due
recognition must also be given to the function served by rules of law in
providing a standard which people follow voluntarily, without regard to
coercion. This latter side of legal rules Hart characterizes as their
"internal" aspect.
Aside from its role relating to primary rules of obligation, Hart's
internal-external duality appears in a number of places in The Concept
of Law, most notably in his analysis of judicial conduct. According to
Hart, the significance of the coercion exerted upon judges to conduct
themselves pursuant to certain rules is minimal, if not entirely nonexistent. He believes that judges do in fact abide by rules governing their
judicial conduct primarily because of their internal aspect--i.e., because
those rules provide a standard of behavior which judges recognize as
proper and which they follow voluntarily-rather than because they fear
that violation of the rules will lead to their being punished.
The combined effect of Hart's theories concerning power-conferring
rules and the internal aspect of rules is to minimize the importance of
legal punishment, or sanctions, or (more precisely) to minimize their
threatened invocation as the motive force in the operation of a developed
legal system. For where power-conferring rules are concerned, the threat
of punishment for their violation is in Hart's view a meaningless concept.
Since Hart regards those rules as enabling people to do certain acts and to
create certain relationships, failure to abide by such rules means simply
that a person remains in the same position he was in before attempting to
create a new relationship or to do a certain act. Not to have succeeded
would, in Hart's view, be a far cry from having been punished. As for
7. Id. at 79.
8. ALF Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1958).
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primary rules of obligation, while their coercive character is not denied
entirely by Hart (since their violation will clearly lead to legal punishment), it is nevertheless tempered by Hart's theory concerning their
internal aspect. That theory holds, in effect, that, though many people in
fact refrain from committing certain antisocial acts for fear of being
punished, others abstain because the embodiment of a norm of conduct in
a legal rule becomes, for that reason alone, a reason for honoring the
norm.
Besides developing these ideas, Hart presents his views concerning
many other important jurisprudential questions in The Concept of Law.
In fact, despite the slender dimensions of the volume, few major areas
of contemporary legal philosophy escape Hart's scrutiny. The very existence of international law; the claims of the natural-law school of jurisprudence and, in particular, the neo-natural-law ideas set forth by Professor Fuller in his 1958 exchange with Hart,' (developed in greater
detail in Fuller's later book, The Morality of Law10 ); the insistence of
some proponents of an extreme form of legal realism that judges follow
their own unfettered discretion at all times, with a complete indifference
to the content of all legal rules: these are only some of the targets of
Professor Hart's critical commentary. These topics and the others in the
book are closely interrelated, forming a cohesive whole. Ideally, an
examination of some would require an examination of all. Since the scope
of the present paper, however, does not permit detailed critical examination of all views expressed by Hart in The Concept of Law, emphasis here
will be primarily upon Hart's position concerning power-conferring rules
and the internal aspect of legal rules. These, in fact, represent the foundation of Professor Hart's whole theoretical structure. Only after he has
attempted to break down traditional positivist positions by employing
these concepts does Hart begin to construct his system of primary and
secondary rules. If, as I believe, Hart's analysis here is faulty, the
validity of other portions of his book would also be open to question.
PROFESSOR HART AND "POWER-CONFERRING" RULES
In treating the views of Austin and his followers on the one hand and
those of Kelsen on the other, concerning the legal rules Hart designates as
"'power-conferring," Hart vacillates between viewing them as expressions
of the same philosophical outlook-that force is a necessary ingredient of
law-and treating them separately. Though Hart does not give this as his
reason for doing so, his uneven treatment of their views may merely
reflect the fact that, despite apparent differences, Kelsen's views on this
9. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAV. L. REv.
630 (1958).
10. LoN L. FULLER, THE MoRALiTy OF LAW (1964).
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point and those of Austin and his followers are not fundamentally dissimilar.
Austin himself, whose legal theory was based on the proposition that
the sovereign commanded his subjects under threat of punishment to
conduct themselves in certain ways, made no distinction between the
varieties of law through which this was done. Whether operating within
the sphere of what Hart describes as primary rules of obligation or dealing with the procedures required to enter into contracts, to marry, to
bequeath property, to conduct the business of a court system, or to enact
or change laws-all these facets of a legal system were either expressly or
impliedly viewed by Austin as expressions of the same phenomenon: the
sovereign's command to his subjects to follow certain patterns of conduct
under threat of being punished if they failed to do so.
Responding to Austin's critics, who asserted that these various types of
activities should rightfully be differentiated, Austin's followers developed
the idea of "nullity as a sanction." According to them, failure to abide by
a legal rule in the area of contracts or wills, for example, though it does
not ordinarily result in a judgment for damages or imprisonment, nevertheless leads to real punishment by the sovereign in the form of nullifying
one's attempted acts carried out in contravention of those rules. This
view, as will be seen, is heartily condemned by Hart.
Kelsen, on the other hand, distinguishes the rules Hart calls "powerconferring" (calling them "rules of competence") from those in the area
of criminal law or torts. This does not mean, however, that Kelsen's position and the concept of nullity as a sanction are incompatible. For the
effect of Kelsen's theory is to avoid a direct collision with the idea of
nullity as a sanction by characterizing rules of competence (i.e., Hart's
power-conferring rules) along with the rules of criminal law and torts, as
not true rules at all, but rather as mere "fragments" of rules. In conformity with Kelsen's general theory that the only true rules of law are
those which prescribe the sanction to be administered by public officials
upon the existence of certain conditions, Hart's "power-conferring" rules
(or Kelsen's "rules of competence") merely represent, for Kelsen, the
conditions or events upon the occurrence of which those officials are
directed to apply the physical force of the state to assist one or more
parties to a dispute.
Reconciliation of the concept of nullity as a sanction with Kelsen's
position can be effected, however, if the word "nullity" is understood as
meaning: "a condition of legal fact whose existence does not permit officials to apply the physical force of the state on behalf of one whose
purported acts are deemed null and void under law."
To illustrate: The Statute of Frauds requires an agreement for the
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sale of real property to be in writing. Buyer and Seller agree orally that
within ten days Buyer will pay $10,000 and Seller will convey Blackacre.
Ten days later, Buyer tenders payment but Seller refuses to convey.
Buyer then sues for specific performance or, in the alternative, damages
for Seller's breach. Because of a failure to conform to requirements of the
applicable statute, the court refuses to grant Buyer any relief.
Under those circumstances, those who hold with the idea of nullity as
a sanction would say that Buyer has been punished for having failed to
perform his duty-which arose when he purported to contract for the
purchase of Blackacre-to embody that agreement in writing. Kelsen,
however, would say that a court of law has refused to apply the physical
force of the state on behalf of Buyer because the conditions which would
bring that force into play have not occurred.
Moreover, if Buyer, despite this judicial determination, or without
having first applied to a court, should enter upon Seller's land with the
intention of occupying it as if it were his own, and if Seller should apply
to a court (either by means of a personal suit or through the intervention
of a public prosecutor on the criminal side) the physical force of the
state would be applied to eject and possibly imprison Buyer. To Kelsen,
this would mean that conditions necessary for the application of force by
public officials against Buyer had occurred. For proponents of the theory
of nullity as a sanction, this would represent a consequence of the
punishment meted out to Buyer for having failed to conform to the
statute's requirements.
Two common ideas underly both theoretical approaches: (1) force or
coercion is central to the idea of law, and (2) the aim of law is to bring
about patterns of conduct which would probably not occur in the absence
of law. This latter function of law, at least insofar as it is found within
Kelsen's analysis, is ignored by Hart. Yet, despite that part of his theory
which sees law as directed at officials rather than at the populace, Kelsen
has made it clear that he regards the function of law in any society as
aimed at bringing about "desired social conduct of men through the threat
of a measure of coercion which is to be applied in the case of contrary
conduct."'"
To the extent that Hart does separate Kelsen and Austin on this question, he dismisses Kelsen's position out of hand as a "distortion." As for
the position of Austin and his followers, however, Hart analyzes these
so-called power-conferring rules at great length, rejecting their indiscriminate assimilation with all other rules of law. Above all, Hart dismisses
as meaningless the concept of nullity as a sanction and undoubtedly had
11. HANS
LLOYD,

KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE

324 (1959).

18-19 (1946); see also

DENNIS
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this in mind when, in his 1958 Harvard Law Review article, he referred
to a "desperate extension of the word 'sanction.' ""
Despite the apparent lucidity of Professor Hart's writing, analysis of
his treatment of these rules reveals that he either inadvertently or deliberately-but consistently-misdirects his attention. Throughout his
entire discussion of this matter, Hart appears to have his eyes focused
upon the wrong end of the problem. Thus, from the very beginning, where
he describes power-conferring rules as providing
individuals with facilities for realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain specified
procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of
rights and duties within the coercive framework of the law ....
11
Hart focuses his attention upon those who in fact benefit from powerconferring rules rather tl~an those who are injured by them, i.e., those
who conform to those rules and are thereby entitled to invoke the assistance of the sovereign in their disputes with third persons, rather than
those who fail to conform to those rules. No great feat of logic is required
to look upon this same phenomenon from an entirely different vantage
point. Instead of viewing laws of this kind as creating powers in those
who abide by them, it is equally plausible to regard them as creating
duties on the part of all persons not to convey property, not to enter into
marriage, not to contract in any way or form other than that prescribed
by law.
Even beyond merely reversing the telescope through which these rules
are viewed, one may ask a more fundamental question: Do so-called
power-conferring rules really confer power, or is their function in fact to
grant legal recognition to, or withold it from, pre-existing powers which
reside in the populace independently of any legal system?
Consider, for example, the situation of A and B, heads of two primitive
families living in adjacent caves. A agrees that in return for B's helping
him dislodge a heavy rock he will assist B in removing a similar rock on
the following day. B performs. A then refuses to fulfill his part of the
bargain. B then demands five gourds as compensation. A refuses. From
what we know of the human spirit, it is not inconceivable that B will now
feel that he should take whatever steps are necessary to right the situation. He may decide to go into A's cave and forcibly take the five gourds
from A's mate; he may decide to steal upon A while he is asleep and crush
his skull with an axe; he may decide instead to wreak greater havoc upon
A's entire family. If B should resort to any of these acts, it is clear that in
12. Supra note 1.
13. HART 27.
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the absence of an organized legal system, he will not be punished,' 14
(although he may be dealt with, in turn, by A's kin or acquaintances).
Thus, upon A's refusal to carry out his promise, the availability of selfhelp to B still confers a measure of effectiveness upon the A-B agreement.
True, once an organized legal system has come into operation, B will
have other means to effectuate his agreement with A. But the legal rules
which tell B that he can be made whole upon A's refusal to perform, by
means of a suit at law or relief in equity, for example, do not make that
agreement effective; they merely substitute other ways of effectuating it.
Admittedly, the existence of a legal order might be said to render such an
agreement more effective than when only self-help was available to B;
self-help is self-limiting, since B may one day find that he himself has
become the victim of another's self-help or revenge. The fact remains,
however, that a "power" to have A perform resided in B without regard to
the existence of a legal system. Once that system arises, all it does is to
grant or withhold recognition of B's power of redress, which is substantially different from conferring that power upon B.
Furthermore, the power-recognizing and power-denying functions of
legal rules-as opposed to the power-conferring character Hart attributes
to them-are not insisted upon without an awareness of the essential
differences between legal and factual powers. Clearly, Hart, like Hohfield,
Salmond and others, is talking about legal power, whereas the power of
self-help, among others, is factual. At the same time, it must be borne in
mind that one of the first functions of an organized legal system is to
remove from all the availability of self-help as a means of righting
wrongs. The goal of primitive law (i.e., law in its "First" stage) was "to
keep the peace, especially to prevent the blood-feud by setting up a tariff
of compositions for the redress of injuries."'

5

Only at the expense of

14. Hart himself recognizes that "there could be no crimes or offences and so no murders
or thefts if there were no criminal laws of the mandatory kind which do resemble orders
backed by threats." HART 32.
15. EowIn J. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS oF THBELAW 513-514 (1953)
(characterizing Roscoe Pound's analysis of a legal system's developmental stages); see also
Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HAiv. L. REv. 195
(1914):
At pp. 198-199: "In the beginnings of law the idea is simply to keep the peace. In
primitive law justice, in the sense of the end of the legal system, was a device to keep the
peace. Whatever served to avert private vengeance and prevent private war was an instrument
of justice. The law existed as a body of rules by which controversies were adjusted peaceably.
At first therefore, it attempted nothing more affirmatively than to furnish the injured person
a substitute for revenge."
At p. 199: "Along with religion and morality, [law] is a regulative agency by which men
are restrained and the social interest in general security is protected. And it retains this
character of a regulative agency and of a means of which the end is a peaceable ordering,
although other ends become manifest as it develops." [Emphasis supplied.]
And at p. 203: "[Primitive law] . . . is made up of regulations as to self-help .
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forfeiting one form of a power to right wrongs (albeit an imperfect and
often an ineffectual one) are other forms of power recognized.
That legal rights or powers may pre-exist their recognition by the
sovereign is not a novel idea. The views of Gierke in regard to corporate
personality, for example, represent an example of this approach. Thus,
Gierke's theories concerning legal associations have been characterized,
in part, as follows:
...The life of an association does not depend upon state recognition. The legal statute which bestows legal personality merely
has declaratory significance, in so far as it declares the general
conditions of juristic personality to be applicable to a particular
association. But it does not create that association, either socially or legally. 6
This capacity to will and act [of a collection of individuals] is
the basis of legal personality.
Legal recognition follows upon it,
17
but does not create it.

Thus, it is evident that the vice in Hart's formulation concerning
"power-conferring" rules lies in the word "confer." For if the analysis is
correct, legal systems do not confer rights; they merely recognize some
and refuse to recognize other pre-existing rights or powers. This is true
of all types of state-created legal sanctions-punishment or damages, as
well as nullity. By requiring that those rights may be exercised only
pursuant to certain procedures and forms (e.g., statutes of frauds requirements, licenses to marry) legal rules create disabilities. They announce
that recognition will be withheld from certain relationships and acts
unless they are created or carried out in accordance with legal prescriptions or, if you will, the sovereign's command. In Kelsen's terms, this
means that the sovereign will not apply force to aid one who asserts rights
that are not established in accord with legal requirements.
Hart has also made much of the fact or, more accurately, his opinion,
that people actually regard laws in these spheres as creating facilities for
doing things. He states, for example:
Such rules [those "conferring" private powers] are thought of,
spoken of, and used in social life differently from rules which
impose duties, and they are valid for different reasons. What
other tests for difference in character could there be?' 8
One may well question the accuracy of Hart's appraisal of peoples'
[and] a tariff of compositions which the injured person or kindred must accept for the
wrongs specified, payment whereof, also, may be compelled . . ."
16. W. G. Fnxsom.ANN, LEGAL THEoRY 187 (4th ed. 1960).
17. Ibid.
18. HART 40.
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attitudes in this area. Much evidence exists that the legal formalities
required for entering into a valid and binding contract, to enter into a
marriage relationship, or to will property are often regarded by people as
impediments to carrying out their wishes, rather than as vehicles for
doing so. The possibility of the state's witholding legal recognition from
acts which violate these requirements strikes people as a threatened
sanction. Their conduct is in fact influenced by what they regard as possible punishment by the state through nullification of their acts. Indeed,
this is the very essence of Kelsen's statement that the aim of law is to
bring about "desired social conduct of men through the threat of a
measure of coercion which is to be applied in the case of contrary conduct."1 9 Unlike the areas of tort and criminal law, where prohibitions
against violating certain rules are continuous, the duty to obey certain
norms in the areas touched by Hart's power-conferring rules is conditional, i.e., it arises only at the time a person wishes to bring about a
certain relationship or do a particular act. At the moment that wish
arises, however, he becomes obliged to conform to law under threat of
being punished. 21 In other words, force will be applied against him if he
should conduct himself as if he had created a valid legal relationship
without having in fact done so.
Hart of course is not unmindful of the fact that some positivists regard "nullity" as a sanction, and that they assimilate power-conferring
rules with coercive rules. Among his objections to their position is his
belief that "in many cases, nullity may not be an 'evil' to the person who
has failed to satisfy some condition required for legal validity."'" As an
example of the foregoing, Hart writes:
[A] party who finds that the contract on which he is sued is not
binding on him, because he was underage or did not sign the
19. See text at note 11, supra.
20. Hart has taken great pains to emphasize a distinction between being "obliged to"
and "having an obligation to" do something. HART 79-84. Essentially, his analysis shows
that, unlike the meaning of the phrase "to have an obligation to" do a thing, which involves
no particular belief on the part of the person having the obligation, the phrase "to be
obliged" to do something "is often a statement about the beliefs and motives with which an
action is done." HART 80. This distinction provides a further basis for Hart's subsequent
development of the internal-external aspects of legal rules. The distinction, while largely unobjectionable, is of limited usefulness if the conditional nature of the duty to comply with
formal requirements is kept in mind. When that is done, it is evident that for most people
long periods of time pass during which they are neither obligated nor obliged to conduct
themselves in any particular manner-at least insofar as obedience to formal requirements
for legal instruments and the like are concerned. Only when they wish to avail themselves of
a certain legal instrument or to do a particular act does the question of following formal
requirements ever arise. At that time, however, they can accurately be described as being
"obliged to," "forced to," or "under a duty to," behave themselves in the manner prescribed
by the legal rules that establish those formalities as necessary conditions for the legal
validity of various instruments, acts and relationships.
21. HART 33.
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memorandum in writing required for certain contracts, might
not recognize here a "threatened evil" or "sanction." 22
Here, as in some other examples he gives,2 3 Hart looks for the possible
effects of a sanction on a person to whom the threat of sanction is not
addressed by the legal rule in question. The requirement that both parties
to a contract must have reached majority is not aimed at regulating the
contractual activities of minors. Instead, its purpose is to regulate the
conduct of those who purport to contract with minors. In effect, they are
told by the sovereign: "If you want to enter into a valid and binding
contract with another, which we will help you enforce, you have a duty,
among others, to ascertain that the person with whom you contract has
reached a certain age. If you breach that duty, you will be punished by
our refusing to recognize any rights you may assert under that contract
upon the occurrence of certain events (e.g., the disaffirmance of the contract by the minor before he reaches majority)."
To say or imply, as Hart does, that a minor might not feel that such
a rule threatened him is to knock down a straw man. Rules of this kind
are never intended to influence a minor's conduct. Rather, the social evil
sought to be curbed by the rule is the practice of mature and knowledgeable adults taking advantage of their superior position by binding immature and inexperienced young persons to unwise contractual obligations.
Similarly, to say, as Hart does, that the person whose failure to sign
a written memorandum required by the Statute of Frauds, which results
in his not being bound by a contract, would not be chagrined at the
prospect, again mistakes the person whose conduct is sought to be regulated by the rule. It is not the nonsigner, but the person who purports
to contract with him, who is addressed by the rule. In effect, he is told:
"If you want to enter into a valid and binding contract with another for
the rental of real property beyond a one-year period, you have a duty
to see to it that the other person signs a memorandum in writing to this
effect. If you breach that duty, you will be punished by our applying
the sanction of nullification; we shall refuse to recognize or enforce any
rights you may claim under such a contract."
In the public sphere, two other types of legal rules are, in Hart's
opinion, also fundamentally different from orders backed by threats:
(1) those regulating the operation of courts of law; 24 (2) statutes conferring legislative powers on a subordinate legislative body.2 5
According to Hart, to judges and legislators rules of this sort represent
22. Ibid.
23. See text following note 27, infra.
24. HART 29.

25. Id. at 30.
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formulations of legal "standards," which are followed because of their
internal aspect; they are not orders requiring obedience under threat of
punishment. Rules setting out the jurisdiction of courts, for example,
are not, in Hart's opinion, designed to deter "judges from improprieties
but to define the conditions and limits under which the court's decisions
shall be valid."2 6 As for those governing the conduct of subordinate legislative bodies, Hart states:
[T]here is a radical difference between rules conferring and
defining the manner of exercise of legislative powers and the
rule of criminal law, which at least resemble orders backed by
threats.
In some cases it would be grotesque to assimilate these two
broad types of rule. If a measure before a legislative body obtains the required majority of votes and is thus duly passed,
the voters in favour of the measure have not "obeyed" the
law requiring a majority decision nor have those who voted
against it either obeyed or disobeyed it; the same is of course
true if the measure fails to obtain the required majority and so
no law is passed. The radical difference in function between
such rules as these prevents the use here of terminology appropriate to conduct in its relation to rules of criminal law."
Assimilation of rules of this kind, however, to general orders backed
by threats does not present the conceptual difficulties Professor Hart
attributes to it-especially if one keeps in mind that the thrust of legal
rules may differ from the language in which they are stated. For example,
even if one were to grant Hart's point that such rules merely guide
courts and legislators and are followed by them voluntarily because of
their internal aspect, this does not mean that those rules have the same
character for all other persons they affect. As in other areas of the law,
rules here have a dual character. Those defining the jurisdiction of
courts are phrased in terms of what a court can (may) or cannot (may
not) do. Still, they are at least partly directed at potential litigants,
i.e., at all those who might at one time or another ask a court to recognize
their claims or deny the claims of their adversaries. In effect, these potential litigants are informed by rules which limit the jurisdiction of
courts: "If you have a claim you want a court to recognize, you have a
duty to bring it before a proper court. If you breach this duty, you will
be punished in one of two ways: (1) The court whose assistance you
seek will recognize that to grant you relief will violate this rule, and
refuse to do so; (2) If that court should mistakenly grant you relief,
and if your opponent takes the necessary steps, a second, higher court
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 31.
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will nullify the first court's action. The rule which states that you will
be punished by a denial of relief if you breach your duty to bring your
claim before the proper court has to be qualified, however, by the existence in many cases of a corresponding rule addressed to your opponent
or potential opponents. This corresponding rule tells them: 'Where your
opponent has brought his action in the wrong court, he will be punished
by the witholding of relief, provided that you carry out your duty to remind the court that it is acting in excess of its jurisdiction, if the court
does not see this itself. If you breach this duty, which arises only when
the action has been brought in the wrong court, you will be punished by
our waiving (at times) the rules on jurisdiction.' "
A similar analysis of the rules conferring legislative powers upon
subordinate legislative bodies would yield comparable results. Though
such rules seem, in form at least, to be addressed only to the legislators
themselves, in effect they are also directed toward all people who have
an interest in the adoption of particular laws by that legislative body.
They are the ones who will be injured by that body's ineffectual adoption of a statute or ordinance for failure to follow formal requirements.
Nor do such rules lack the threat of force insofar as judges and legislators themselves are concerned. Although the law does not make such
conduct criminal, the sanctions available against the judge who purports
to act in excess of his judicial powers are real, formidable, and-if we
recall that a norm of conduct may differ from that derived from a literal
reading of the rule involved-evident. For, in the case of the judge himself, the rule defining his jurisdiction can be read as implying the application of sanctions only after repeated or serious violations. As understood by the judge, the rule could be stated as follows: "You have a
duty to entertain only those actions and proceedings we have entrusted
to you. We recognize that at times it will be difficult for you to determine
whether a particular subject falls within your area of competence. If
you err sometimes in cases of that sort you will not be punished. However, if you err consistently, or in cases where reasonable men could
not differ, you will be considered to have breached your duty and you will
be punished in one of various ways, including your removal from office."
In this connection, Graham Hughes has pointed out that even in the
absence of "clearly defined" physical sanctions, judges' compliance with
rules may be motivated largely by self-interest," i.e., by a fear of dismissal from office; and that it is "quite possible to see official behaviour
as being motivated in no different way from the behaviour of the ordinary citizen." 9
Again, a similar analysis would yield comparable results in the case
28. Hughes, supra note 3.
29. Ibid.
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of legislators who repeatedly or drastically violated rules governing their
legislative competence. Imagine the consternation and anger of the
American electorate, for example, if the statutes establishing the federal
income tax had been adopted by less than a majority of each federal
legislative body-and if those legislators and other public officials had
attempted to conduct themselves as if those measures had in fact become law. The sanctions that would have flowed from such breach of a
rule would have ranged all the way from refusal to re-elect the legislators,
to recall movements, to impeachment proceedings, and, possibly, to the
ultimate sanction of violent revolution.
COMMENTS
If, as has been suggested, Hart's analysis of "power-conferring" rules
has gone wrong, how can this be explained? Several possibilities suggest
themselves. One is that Hart's main goal in The Concept of Law,
whether he was aware of it or not, was to present his views on the existence of international law.3" In this regard, to those who say that international law does not exist because neither sovereign nor sanction
operate within its sphere, Hart in effect replies: "I have just demonstrated how law may exist in a municipal system without either of
these features; ergo, international law also exists." In other words, his
analysis of municipal law may have been shaped, consciously or unconsciously, by his desire to arrive at the aforementioned conclusions
concerning international law.
A second, more fundamental explanation is that despite Hart's protestations to the contrary, his position as a legal positivist is not as pure
as he claims it to be. To be sure, Hart asserts his credentials as a legal
positivist."' He declares repeatedly that his major disagreement with
Austin and Kelsen is in their insistence upon command or force as a
necessary ingredient of law. He also believes that there is no contradiction in separating "is" from "ought" and rejecting command theories
of law." Yet, a close examination of Hart's statements reveals that he
often lapses into natural-law patterns of thinking. Indeed, the key to
Hart's analysis of "power-conferring" rules can be found in the following
statement concerning those rules in the private sphere:
The confusion inherent in thinking of nullity as similar to the
threatened evil or sanctions of the criminal law may be brought
out in another form. In the case of the rules of the criminal law,
it is logically possible and might be desirable that there should
be such rules even though no punishment or other evil were
threatened. It may of course be argued that in that case they
30. HART 208-231.
31. Hart, supra note 1.
32. Ibid.
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would not be legal rules; nonetheless, we can distinguish clearly
the rule prohibiting certain behaviour from the provision for
penalties to be exacted if the rule is broken, and suppose the
first to exist without the latter. We can, in a sense, subtract
the sanction and still leave an intelligible standard of behaviour which it was designed to maintain. But we cannot
logically make such a distinction between the rule requiring
compliance with certain conditions, e.g. attestation for a valid
will, and the so-called sanction of "nullity." In this case, if
failure to comply with this essential condition did not entail
nullity, the rule itself could not be intelligibly said to exist without sanctions even as a non-legal rule.3 [Emphasis supplied.]
Stripped of its rhetoric, all Hart is saying here is that a rule of criminal law, such as one prohibiting assault, strikes him as desirable (and
no doubt compatible with his views concerning the "minimum content"
of law expressed elsewhere in the book34 ), whereas one requiring attestation for a valid will does not-and, that even in the absence of law,
the former rule would be desirable and reasonable. Is this not the essence
of the natural-law outlook? And is this not also the basis of Hart's
entire analysis of "power-conferring" rules, the internal aspect of rules,
and, as a result, his "union" of primary and secondary rules in a developed legal system?
Hart's error of course lies in ignoring the purpose of a rule requiring
two witnesses to a will. If that purpose is kept in mind, the rule becomes
just as intelligible as one which provides for sanctions to be administered
by officials if they find that a defendant has assaulted his victim. That
purpose is to satisfy the social interest (to employ Pound's phrase) in
giving effect to only those wills which have in fact been executed by the
person whose will it purports to be. Rightly or not, society has concluded as a result of its experience that a designated number of witnesses
to a will is necessary to avoid fraudulent claims that a will has been duly
made by the testator, when in fact it was not.
Hart commits the same error in another context. Referring to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, he writes:
In the case of a rule of criminal law we can identify and distinguish two things: a certain type of conduct which the rule
prohibits, and a sanction intended to discourage. But how
could we consider in this light such desirable social activities
as men making each other promises which do not satisfy legal
requirements as to form?35 [Emphasis supplied.]
33. HART 34.
34. Id. at 189-195.
35. Id. at 34.
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But in suggesting that contractual arrangements, as compared with
criminal conduct, are "desirable social activities" even if they do not
satisfy formal requirements, Hart again completely ignores the social
reasons for rules requiring formalities as conditions to validity. The
Statute of Frauds became law in response to injustices arising when
persons, previously found by courts of law to have obligated themselves
contractually, turned out later not to have done so in fact. It was to
prevent such evils that the statute was enacted. The only fraud that
might possibly be related to the statute is that perpetrated by one who
claims that another had contracted with him orally to perform an act,
when in fact he had not. A more appropriate name for the statute would
probably have been a "Statute to Prevent Frauds." The suppression of
such undesirable practices has always been the main goal of the statute.
To achieve its purposes, it became necessary to impose the requirement
of a writing even upon those who had contracted orally in fact. In the
light of the policy of the Statute of Frauds, however, such contractual
arrangements (i.e., oral contracts in the specified areas) were no longer
as socially desirable as they had been before the statute's enactment,
because of the problems of proof they would present to the courts in
the event of a dispute. The social interest in encouraging voluntary
private contractual arrangements was outweighed by another social interest in preventing frauds upon individuals or the courts. To this extent, contractual arrangements which did not satisfy the formal requirement that they be in writing became less desirable than they had been
prior to the time a writing requirement had been established. That they
were not rendered totally undesirable can be seen from the numerous
exceptions that have been engrafted upon the Statute of Frauds by
subsequent legislation and judicial decisions.
Analyzed in this manner, legal requirements as to form in the private
sphere of Hart's "power-conferring" rules are seen as socially necessary.
Also, they may be enforced by punishing those who disobey them by the
nullification of their acts or, in Kelsen's terms, a refusal to apply the
physical force of the state to assist them. The goals of order and
predictability in judicial and legislative conduct are also highly cherished
social interests. Failure of judges, legislators, or (as discussed earlier)
private individuals to comply with legal rules adopted to serve those
interests is punished with equal, if not greater, severity.
Finally, Hart's views on the internal-external duality of legal rules
also require appraisal. For even if the analysis to this point has demonstrated that, contrary to Hart's position, "power-conferring" rules in
the public as well as the private sphere are not essentially different from
rules prohibiting crimes, the effect of their internal aspect would still
be to weaken imperative theories of law. Though the threat of punishment for their violation accompanied all legal rules, this would be of
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limited significance if, in fact, those rules were obeyed-at some times
and by some people-without regard to that threat.
Here, as in his discussion of "power-conferring" rules, Hart's analysis
is insightful, probing, and a delight to read. Yet, in describing the dual
effect of legal rules, Hart ignores the existence of a more fundamental
duality: that of the human spirit. One cannot overlook the fact that
man-individually and collectively-is at the same time a rational being
and a member of the animal kingdom. It is quite possible that whenever
the internal aspect of rules are in fact operative, they work on man in
his capacity of a rational being. Still, the same person who, on an intellectual level, abides by a rule of law without regard to coercion (because,
as Hart says, the embodiment of a norm of conduct in a legal rule is
for him a reason for honoring that norm) may still need the rule's external aspect, i.e., the threat of being punished if he violates the rule.
This is likely to occur when he is confronted with a choice between
violating a rule in furtherance of his immediate self-interest or abiding
by it and promoting a longer-range interest but disserving one that is
clear and present. In Hart's analysis, however, (although not in express
terms), the clear implication is that some people are susceptible only to
the external aspect of legal rules while others are influenced by their
internal aspect. That both aspects may play a significant role in the
conduct of the same individual is never considered by Hart.
In addition, Hart ignores entirely the effect that the coercive or external aspect of legal rules has upon the development of peoples' susceptibility to their internal aspect. While many individuals have managed to
escape to some extent the demands of self-interest, this has occurred in
large part as a result of the educative function of law-both within the
lifetime of the individual and that of the human race. To the extent that
the internal aspect of legal rules influences social behavior, this has been
brought about in great measure because of prior experience with, and
obedience to, the external or purely coercive aspect of those rules. The
heart of the law is still coercion. Not until observance of Kant's Categorical Imperative has become a way of life, rather than a philosophical
edict, will it be otherwise.

